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The sheer size of the AARP makes it appear formidable, therefore, in order to
respond to charges being levied by some advocates of generational equity that [old age interest groups] are concerned with the special interests of the elderly population to the exclusion of the legitimate interests of any others.Eric R. Kingson (1988) suggests that
the resources . . . at the disposal of elderly interest groups are more important to the success of their lobbying and other efforts than the perception that they are not selfish. After all, why should elder interest groups, or any other interest groups for that matter, be expected to be unselfish?Furthermore, the elderly have enormous political clout at the polls—they vote in vast numbers.
The AARP’s, members, who are mainly middle class, can be counted on to turn out at election time. In 1980, 71% of Americans aged 55-64 went to the polls, compared with 36% of those aged 18-20.Kingson, Eric R. “Generational Equity: An Unexpected Opportunity to Broaden the Politics of Aging.” The Gerontologist . 28.6 (1988): 765-772. “Old, But Far From Feeble,” The Economist 12 Mar. 1988: 30.
Walter A. Rosenbaum (1993) and James W. Button contest Kingson’s (1988) view that there is
a deterioration in the public image upon which the political privilege of the aging is grounded [and which] is a bellwether of generational tensionand argue that most studies of political preferences among the elderly generally highlight only those issues and policies that directly impact the elderly rather than issues and policies that effect all Americans. Indeed, they found that
studies of candidate and party preference among the aging, like policy studies, seldom reveal significant associations between age and voting choice that cannot be explained by other socioeconomic factors.Rosenbaum, Walter A., and James W. Button. “The Unquiet Future of Intergenerational Politics.” The Gerontologist . 33.4 (1993): 481-490. Furthermore, it is clear that the vast majority of all money given to political parties is given to the party in power Rosenbaum, Walter A., and James W. Button. “The Unquiet Future of Intergenerational Politics.” The Gerontologist . 33.4 (1993): 481-490. Salant, Jonathan D. “Where the PAC Money Goes.” Congressional Quarterly 15 Apr 1995: 1058-1059. so that access gained through financial means is largely based on pocketbook issues that effect most citizens. Moreover, Laurie A. Rhodebeck (1993) maintains that while
older Americans share common age-related concerns . . . they are
hardly subject to the solidifying experiences typical of [other minorities].She further argues that:
several conditions seem likely to enhance cohesion among older people. The development of retirement communities may encourage interactions that foster an awareness of common political interests. The availability of senior citizen perquisites may promote a sense of group entitlement that extends to the policy arena. Finally, recent deficit reduction measures that have threatened the viability of public assistance for the elderly may serve as effective mobilizers of group interests and powerful inducements to the maintenance of group unity. Rhodebeck, Laurie A. “The Politics of Greed? Political Preferences among the Elderly.” The Journal of Politics. 55.2 (1993): 342-364.
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