1.1 Social cognition: meaning and beliefs

Meaning generation is the way someone interprets the world, the meaning they make from various stimulus. They then can use this meaning as 'meaning action' - which is the behaviors that follow because of the meaning that was generated (or just the action that follows directly from the meaning you interpret).

• First, we shall compare the two processes from the viewpoint of eliciting conditions. Whereas meaning action is initiated by the representation of incoming stimuli, meaning generate is initiated either by the initial meaning established through meaning action or by both the stimulus representation and previously established meaning values. The latter is the case when no initial meaning could be established at all, or not to the degree and extent sufficient for eliciting some defensive or adaptive response. Under these circumstances the combination of the meaning values attained through meaning action generally yields such an ambiguous profile, full of gaps and uncertainty nodes, that the representation of the original stimulus, insofar as it still exists or can be reconstructed or reestablished, must be resorted to. Kreitler, H. + Kreitler, S. (1976) "Cognitive Orientation and Behavior" Springer Publishing Company, New York.

So if you have some sort of meaning that is generated in your mind, then incoming stimulus could trigger a behavioral response - or meaning action. Or a response could be elicited by both your understanding and your previously established understanding. If you cannot establish a new understanding, you probably are going to rely on a previous one. The way your mind interprets everything is so complex that you might just resort to your initial response (or intellectual representation) that you had about the stimulus.

• Second, from the viewpoint of function, the task of meaning action is to establish those meaning values which by virtue of their signal or cue function may trigger adequate defensive or adaptive responses, or, alternately, orienting responses. Thus the role of meaning action could not be regarded as providing for a full-fledged identification of the input. Nonetheless, the combination of the meaning values yielded by meaning action makes possible some kind of identification of input. It is, however, a highly restricted or general identification, because it is established merely for the purposes of immediate reaction. As a rule, initial meaning does not include anything that might correspond to a "conception" of the input but only the bare minimum of meaning values with signal value. At its poorest, initial meaning consists only of one meaning value, as in the case of the male stickleback, who in the breeding season attacks within his territory anything with a red patch, the patch sufficing to identify an adult male stickleback with the nuptial marking of an intensely red throat and belly. At its best, however, initial meaning includes a few meaning values that may mediate identification in a pars-pro-toto manner. In contrast, the task of meaning generation is to establish comprehensive meaning, which not only provides for identification of the input on a much broader basis but also includes the personal relevance of the stimulus situation for the individual. By virtue of its orientative contents this comprehensive meaning predisposes the individual toward a certain course of molar action. Thus, comprehensive meaning is anchored in action, unfolds for the sake of action, and directs action to no less degree than initial meaning. But while the orientative impact of initial meaning is much more immediate and direct, the orientative impact of comprehensive meaning is the product of more meaning values, interrelated through more complex relations, and subjected to further cognitive elaborations. Hence the bond of comprehensive meaning to action is less direct and immediate, more complex and equivocal. However, it is evident that molar no less than submolar behavior is directed and shaped by meaning from its origins to its completion, marked by evaluation of its outcomes. Even exploratory behavior is not elicited automatically whenever repeated meaning actions following several evocations of orienting responses have failed to establish an adequate and sufficient initial meaning. As in the case of other forms of molar behavior, its elicitation depends on the products of meaning generation and certain elaborations of these products.