0.19 Natural capital: fisheries  (Page 12/14)

There was no ITQ initially. There was a 100 day tightly enforced fishing season for halibut. But competition increased so drastically that there was a classic: “race to fish” situation: catch everything while you can. This did not achieve the desired result. So in response the halibut season was reduced, progressively, all the way down to 2 days in 1992.

Imagine 400 boats at anchor in the small harbor of the City of King Salmon – ready to put to sea. This led to the most intensive fishing one could ever observe – boats battling each other for the catch and a sharp rise in fishing deaths.

So, Alaska implemented a variant of an ITQ system in 1995.

As elsewhere, the authorities

1. Determined the TAC
2. Provided quotas to each boat owner
3. Total quotas awarded added up to the TAC, for each year
4. Quotas were awarded free of charges ( a mistake, hopefully to be corrected)
5. Each owner’s quota was converted into an ITQ, showing his share of the total
6. No boat captain or firm was allowed to hold more than 1.5% of the total TAC

How successful has the Alaskan system been?

After a couple of years of missteps, it has been so successful that:

1. The halibut season has even been extended substantially
2. Prices for Halibut have climbed, for 2 reasons
   • Fewer Halibut are now caught
   • Now, more halibut can be sold as fresh fish, which attracts a 25% premium over frozen halibut. Under the old system, one caught as much as one could, but froze most in order to not flood the market at any given time
3. The size of the fishing fleet has halved , from 3,000 to 1,500. There are lessons for other countries from the experience of Iceland and Alaska.

But even where ITQS can be successfully implemented that is probably not enough to forestall threats that may lead to fishing collapses, especially in poorer nations.

Other measures must also be taken: One important measure: End subsidies to fishing .

As noted in chapter ___, many emerging nations (Nigeria, Venezuela, and Indonesia, among many others) heavily subsidize diesel fuel. EU nations subsidize diesel fuel used by fishermen. A very large share (25-30%) of fishing costs is for fuel. And in a few nations, total subsidies to diesel fuel used in fishing boats exceed the actual value of the catch.

A second measure: Prohibit or regulate the discard of “by-catch . Example: In fishing for Tuna boats board a lot of fish of other species that are not as valuable. Most by-catch in most of the world is dumped overboard. Usually the fish are dead or soon will be. By-catch in many nations constitutes 25% of total catch. This is clearly a needless waste of valuable resource.

Regulations are required here; regulations that specify that all by-catch be kept and brought back to port. (By-catch needs to be reported as part of any ITQ). This may seem unreasonable. Suppose the by-catch is the decidedly untasty fish called “Irish Lord.” If the by-catch is not fit to eat, it can be sold for fishmeal and fertilizer. There are good markets for these products.

Trawlers with dragnets are the worst offenders regarding by-catch. The severity of the by-catch problem differs by species and region.