0.1 Preface

This book traces the fitful course of federal attempts to define, formulate, and implement national science policy from the pre-war years of the Roosevelt administration through the early months of the Obama administration. It speculates only in the most general terms about what might constitute a consistent national science policy—one that would apply science and technology more effectively to a wide range of agreed-upon national objectives and provide adequate financial and human resources to the effort.

Arguably, part of the fitfulness is attributable to conflicts between the government’s executive and legislative branches. Inconstancy also stems from disagreements between the scientific community and the government. It is also worth noting that there is no monolithic scientific community (or, better, science and engineering community) in the United States. Rather, there are multiple communities, over a wide spectrum of disciplines, which have disagreed among themselves about science policy. However, these communities—particularly their academic components—have been virtually unanimous in insisting that government should provide them with generous financial support for their research and educational activities, and that such support is in the national interest. But executive and legislative branches alike have sometimes regarded such arguments as special pleading by just another special interest group.

Since the late 1970s, American industry’s spending for research and development has exceeded federal spending, although the bulk of those expenditures are for applied research and development. Government is still the primary funder of basic research, which is largely conducted in academia. Yet American companies still have a significant stake in an effective government science policy. Since the 1980s, industry has depended on universities to provide discoveries that industry can commercialize. Industry fortunes also depend on federal regulation and the maintenance of good relations with foreign governments.

Views on what a national science policy should be have emerged from three differing perspectives:

1. Beginning in the second term of the Roosevelt administration, social scientists within the administration argued that scientific resources could be an effective tool for governance.
2. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the scientific elite argued that a consistent national science policy was needed for scientific results to advance the public good. As a necessary corollary, a national science policy for the public good required that scientific research receive generous federal financial support.
3. Scientists who had occupied key positions in the World War II Office of Research and Development emphasized the need for a national science policy that would preserve strong links between civilian science and the military services.

The ongoing effort to build a consistent national science policy has been marked by the insistence that special access to the highest policy levels of the federal government, including the president, is essential. Such access was in place during World War II, when Vannevar Bush served as de facto science advisor to President Roosevelt. It flourished during the short period between the shock of Sputnik in 1957 and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963. By 1968, the effectiveness of the presidential science advisory system was noticeably fraying, and it collapsed completely when President Richard Nixon ended it in January 1973.