0.11 The carter and reagan years: 1977-89  (Page 3/10)

Press’s defense of his tenure

During his tenure as science advisor, Press often defended his performance by noting that working quietly within the inner precincts was consistent with the Carter administration’s operating style, and that any attempt to go beyond that style would endanger the newly established science advisory system. In a short article published near the end of his term, he noted that the abolition of PCST had come under particular criticism:

Conditions for operating a PCST or PSAC are different today [than during the Eisenhower or Kennedy administrations] when one takes into account the Freedom of Information Act’s requirement for open meetings, and the vast agenda beyond national security concerns for the Science Adviser. However, the lack of these formal groups has not deterred the President, nor OSTP, from calling on the country’s most knowledgeable people in all fields of science and engineering for broad or specific advice. Frank Press, “Advising Presidents on Science and Technology,” in William T. Golden, ed., Science Advice to the President (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), 8.

Press often displayed irritation bordering on contempt at the frequent calls to testify before congressional committees. Later, he referred to congressional oversight as “an albatross around the neck of the science adviser,” in that it stood in the way of a fully confidential relationship with the president. Press in Golden, 1988, op. cit . He advocated a return to the Eisenhower practice of having the science advisor provide confidential advice to the president without accountability to Congress or coordination with the federal research system. National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2006. Volume 2. (Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, 2006 (NSB 06-01A)), Chapter 4

The general impression at the end of the Carter administration was that the hoped-for revitalization of national science policy had not materialized. OSTP failed to gain sufficient institutional standing to weather an easy transition into the Reagan administration, and congressional committees, convinced that they could not share responsibility for science policy with the White House, lost interest in comprehensive science policy and focused on parochial issues.

University-industry research cooperation

During the latter half of the 1970s, science policy began including the interests and participation of American industry. As foreign countries rebuilt their war-damaged industrial infrastructures, American companies significantly increased their R&D expenditures; by 1979, federal and industrial R&D expenditures were equal, although industrial investment was much more weighted toward development and applied research.

Private industry also began not only to support but also to participate directly in university research. By 1975, industrial support for research in universities constituted 3.3 percent of total investment, with the federal government accounting for 67.2 percent. Perhaps more important were federal initiatives to foster research cooperation between universities and industry. Although by law the NSF cannot provide research support to profit-making organizations, it could and did begin supporting universities in research collaborations with industry. In 1978, NSF initiated a pilot program to encourage such cooperation, initially called the Applied Science and Research Applications Program. Although the program was terminated at the insistence of the National Science Board, support for university-industry cooperation continued under other programs.